Trust and control in evolving inter-organisational relationships: evidence from the aerospace industry by Varoutsa, Evangelia & Scapens, Robert W.
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trust and Control in Evolving Inter-organisational 
Relationships: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry 
 
 
Journal: Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 
Manuscript ID AAAJ-02-2013-1218.R2 
Manuscript Type: Research Paper 
Keywords: 
Trust, Control, Inter-organisational relationships, Supply chain maturity 
model, Aerospace industry, Duality 
  
 
 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
 
 
1 
 
Trust and Control in Evolving Inter-organisational Relationships: 
Evidence from the Aerospace Industry 
Structured Abstract:  
Purpose – This paper contributes to debates about the relationship between trust and control 
in the governance of inter-organisational relationships. In particular, we focus on the question 
of how the relationship between trust and control shifts over time. 
Design/methodology/approach – An in-depth case study was conducted in a company 
operating in the aerospace industry. We aim to understand this company’s practices and, at 
the same time, to use our case study to deepen our knowledge of the complex trust/control 
nexus. We follow the changes in the relationship between trust and control as the company 
restructured its supply chain, and discuss issues which it had to address in the later phases of 
the supply chain restructuring.  
Findings – The paper illustrates the duality of the trust/control nexus. We show how the 
studied company coped with the complex relationships with its suppliers as collaboration 
increased. We identify particular control mechanisms that the company developed to manage 
such complexity, such as a supplier strategy and a relationship profile tool. 
Research limitations – The paper studies supply chain restructuring and the changing 
relationship of trust and control over time only from the perspective of the 
assembler/manufacturer which ‘owns’/manages the supply chain.  
Originality/value – We observe a move from inter-personal trust to inter-organisational trust. 
Furthermore, we illustrate how managers can intervene to maintain and stabilise trust and 
ensure that trust and control do not degrade or escalate beyond desirable levels.  
 
Keywords: Trust, Control, Duality, Inter-organisational relationships, Supply chain maturity 
model, Aerospace industry 
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Trust and Control in Evolving Inter-organisational Relationships: 
Evidence from the Aerospace Industry 
1. Introduction  
 
Various scholars have explored the way in which trust is constituted in inter-organisational 
relationships. Although referring specifically to the context of management control within 
organisations, Merchant (1985) noted that “almost every control system involves some 
degree of trust that the individuals of concern will do what is best for the organization 
without any, or with only incomplete, monitoring of actions or results” (p. 39). It is only 
relatively recently that researchers have started to examine the relationship between trust and 
control in inter-organisational relationships and to date no consensus has been reached (see, 
for example, Caglio and Ditillo, 2008; Chua and Mahama, 2007; Dekker, 2004). However, 
trust is important in inter-organisational relationships, as trust assists in resolving the paradox 
of inter-organisational relationships where partners can also be competitors. The existence of 
trust enables such partners to exchange sensitive information and promotes interaction and 
commitment.  
 
Although some studies have explored the relationship between trust and control in inter-
organisational relationships, how this relationship shifts over time has not been extensively 
studied (see Tomkins, 2001, for a notable exception). While Tomkins (2001) highlighted that 
the relationship between trust and control could change as the relationships between the 
partners change, much of the literature explores the relationship between trust and control 
from a rather static perspective (Coletti et al., 2005; Das and Teng, 2002) and as a 
consequence it fails to offer insights into the processes through which trust develops as inter-
organisational relationships mature. In general terms, it is necessary to achieve a balance 
between trust and control (Das and Teng, 2001), but this is unlikely to be a simple and static 
balance as  inter-organisational relationships themselves change over time (Tomkins, 2001). 
Even though the relationship between trust and control may change as the relationship 
changes, the existing literature adopts a rather static approach in studying the relationship 
between trust and control. However, there are calls in the literature for research to adopt a 
more dynamic approach and to study trust and control across the life cycle of an inter-
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organisational relationship (see, for example, Das and Teng, 2002; Langfield-Smith, 2008). 
Furthermore, other academics have called for further research into the trust building process 
(Caglio and Ditillo, 2008; Free, 2008; Meira et al., 2010).  
 
In this paper we examine the relationship between trust and control in inter-organisational 
relationships and, in particular, how trust develops as inter-organisational relationships 
mature. We study the inter-organisational relationships of a company in the aerospace 
industry as it restructured its supply chain. Although studies of supply chains are increasingly 
popular in a number of disciplines, they have received only relatively moderate attention 
from accounting scholars.  We adopt a longitudinal perspective and study the trust/control 
nexus as the studied supply chain moved from arm’s length relationships to (eventually) 
partnerships. To provide a structure for our analysis of how the relationship between trust and 
control shifts over time we draw on the supply chain maturity model (SCMM) of Berry et al. 
(2000). More specifically, we study how the aerospace company moved from (1) arm’s 
length relationships with its suppliers (autonomous firm phase) to (2) identifying preferred 
suppliers (serial dependence phase), then to (3) increased collaboration (reciprocal 
dependence phase) and finally to (4) establishing partnerships with preferred suppliers 
(mutual dependence phase).[1] We argue that in the early phases the trust/control nexus can be 
conceptualised as a dualism. However, as we will show, over time as the supply chain 
matures and relationships become more collaborative and complex we need to understand the 
trust/control nexus as a duality. We thereby contribute to the discussions of the relationship 
between trust and control in the governance of inter-organisational relationships; specifically 
we demonstrate that the relationship shifts over time. Although our data does not enable us to 
explain in detail how or why it changed over time, we are able to examine and compare the 
relationship between trust and control in each of the four phases of the SCMM.  
 
The paper has two dimensions; firstly, we examine the process of moving to a ‘mature’ 
supply chain and secondly we explore issues which arise when the supply chain has matured. 
Due to the importance and complexity of the later phases of the SCMM, and the duality of 
trust and control in those phases, we will focus more on those later phases: viz., the reciprocal 
dependence phase and mutual dependence phase. We will describe mechanisms developed in 
practice to manage collaboration in these later phases, and in particular mechanisms designed 
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to maintain trust in an extended supply chain where there is significant staff turnover. In such 
a context, we observed an attempt to standardise and depersonalise trust in order to provide a 
more formalised approach for managing collaboration. The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows. In the following section we discuss the notion of trust and the literature 
on the trust/control nexus. Then we discuss our research design and subsequently present our 
case study. We conclude by discussing our findings and their implications. 
 
2. Trust and Control: Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
Trust is frequently referred to as the “willingness of one party to relate with another in the 
belief that the other’s actions will be beneficial rather than detrimental to the first party” 
(Child and Faulkner, 1998, p. 45); where this willingness “is held without undue doubt or 
suspicion and in the absence of detailed information about the actions of that other party” 
(Tomkins, 2001, p. 165) or “irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” 
(R. C. Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712). As such, trust provides the basis for an expectation which 
removes (or at least reduces) the fear that the other party will act opportunistically (Bradach 
and Eccles, 1989; Gulati, 1995). This expectation can be based on contractual, competence 
and/or goodwill trust. Contractual trust reflects accepted standards of honesty and is the 
expectation that the other party will fully honour the agreement (oral or written). Contractual 
trust is embedded in the transaction and usually exists prior to contracting (van der Meer-
Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). Competence trust reflects the confidence that the other party 
has the necessary capabilities to perform the task satisfactorily (Sako, 1992). Competence 
trust is often related to objective expectations, such as the partner’s management or technical 
capabilities, skills, know-how and reliability (Das and Teng, 1998; Dekker, 2004). Goodwill 
trust “is a sure feeling that trading partners possess a moral commitment to maintaining a 
trading relationship” (Sako, 1992, p. 10). Shared norms and values, the absence of 
opportunistic behaviour in the past, and an open commitment and reciprocity are 
preconditions for the establishment of goodwill trust (Sako, 1992).  
 
The literature provides a plethora of classifications and different concepts of trust, though 
many concepts seem to share similarities. For example, Nooteboom (2002) distinguished thin 
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and thick trust, where thin trust arises from macro sources, such as the institutional 
environment of the partners (i.e. norms, values, laws), while thick trust originates from micro 
sources, such as reputation, friendship, routines, etc., and is therefore more personalized. 
Thin trust only compensates for the possibility of negative behaviour, without creating any 
positive expectations, and thus is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
continuance of an inter-organisational relationship. As such, thin trust needs to be reinforced 
by the development of thick trust. Building on thin trust, partners when entering into a new 
relationship “must have the willingness” to undertake behavioural risks, and form positive 
expectations about the other partners’ behaviour (van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 
2010, p. 91). Such positive expectations, through processes of trust building, may result in 
thick trust.  
 
Various claims have been made in literature about the relationship between trust and control 
and studies have identified complex interconnections between them. Some scholars 
conceptualise the trust/control nexus as a dualism, where “trust and control are two separate 
routes to risk reduction” (Das and Teng, 2001, p. 276). Studies that treat the trust/control 
nexus as ‘distinct linkages’ have shown that trust can be an alternative to or substitute for 
control. Knights et al. (2001, p. 314) pointed out that “a long tradition of management 
thought conceptualizes trust and control as opposing alternatives”, where formal control 
allows the development of limited trust and vice versa. For example, the existence of trust 
can mitigate the need for control, especially in cases where activities and output cannot be 
measured with any certainty (see Dekker, 2004; Tomkins, 2001; van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman, 2000; Vosselman and van der Meer-Kooistra, 2006). So if trust is damaged or 
reduced, there will be more emphasis on formal control, while if trust increases, there is less 
need for formal control (Inkpen and Currall, 2004; Vlaar et al., 2007). On the other hand, the 
establishment of more control mechanisms will reduce the need for trust. Furthermore, Free 
(2008) showed that the extensive implementation of control can actually damage established 
trust.  
 
Other studies, however, see the relationship between trust and control as a complementary 
one, where trust and control reinforce each other. Cooper and Slagmulder (2004) 
conceptualised trust as a necessary condition for the adoption of specific control techniques, 
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such as open-book accounting. The development of both contractual and goodwill trust can 
mitigate the risk of opportunistic behaviour between the partners and the possible abuse of 
the unequal bargaining power created by information asymmetry (Sako, 1992; van der Meer-
Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). Inkpen and Currall (2004) argued that in a supply chain 
relationship the selection of initial control mechanisms will depend on the level of trust 
between the partners. Furthermore, a close relationship will not develop unless there is trust 
(Das and Teng, 1998; Tomkins, 2001). In addition, Tomkins (2001) claimed that in the early 
and middle stages of the development of a relationship, control mechanisms help trust to 
develop, as a certain level of trust is needed to achieve effective control over one’s partners, 
though in later more mature stages, further control can harm trust. Control mechanisms 
generate information which can promote the development of competence trust (Das and 
Teng, 2001). Higher levels of control enable managers to interpret their partners’ behaviour 
(Vlaar et al., 2007) as control mechanisms help managers to develop shared expectations and 
to coordinate their activities (K. J. Mayer and Argyres, 2004). Furthermore, through regular 
contacts, the development of mutual interests (Das and Teng, 2001; Langfield-Smith and 
Smith, 2003) and the two-way flow of information derived from the application of control 
mechanisms (Sako and Helper, 1998), goodwill trust can be enhanced. The closer the partners 
work together, the greater the development of goodwill trust (Langfield-Smith, 2008). 
 
In contrast to the literature that sees trust and control as a dualism, Möllering (2005) argued 
that trust and control should be conceptualised as duality, as they “each assume the existence 
of the other, refer to each other and create each other, but remain irreducible to each other” 
(p. 284). Even though Möllering saw control mechanisms only as monitoring mechanisms, he 
claimed that trust assumes the existence of control and control assumes the existence of trust, 
in such a way that one is not sufficient if it is not supported by the other. Khodyakov (2007) 
studied the processes in creative organisations and provided empirical evidence that trust and 
control are mutually irreducible concepts that are always co-present. He argued that during 
his study “it was hard to understand when collaboration is facilitated by trust or control, 
which suggests that these governance strategies cannot be fully understood without 
considering the roles both of them play at the same time” (ibid, p. 15). Möllering’s (2005) 
and Khodyakov’s (2007) comments about trust and control as dualities are not alien to the 
accounting literature. Vosselman and van der Meer-Kooistra, in their 2009 paper, pointed out 
that control and trust can be seen as highly interrelated complements, which are instrumental 
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in absorbing uncertainty, and that one cannot exist without the other. They conceptualised the 
trust/control relationship as an interactive one, whereby it can be both complementary and 
supplementary at the same time in order to reach positive expectations about future behaviour 
(also, see Das and Teng, 1998). Control mechanisms can be seen as the carriers of trust, as 
they create a platform that will encourage and build further trust. Embedded control 
structures, which provide a basis for the development of thick trust, mitigate the fear that the 
other party might engage in opportunistic behaviour (van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 
2010). Vosselman and van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) claimed that “a trust-based pattern is 
not necessarily a substitute for formal control, but that trust (building) may interact with 
formal control as it is incorporated in a governance structure” (p. 6). 
 
Vélez et al., (2008) studied the influence in management control systems on firmly 
established trust in the mature stages of open-ended inter-organisational relationships. 
Drawing on a longitudinal case study of the distribution channels of a manufacturing 
company, they argued that greater trust can be built through the use of management control 
systems, even where trust is already high. Similarly, Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003, p. 
304) pointed out that “trust may be compatible with the development of tighter accounting 
controls and contracts if trust is already well-established and those controls develop in a 
supportive and cooperative manner involving both parties”. As van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Scapens (2008, p. 381) explained, “trust can be built where the governance of these 
relationships provides sufficient structure to mitigate the risks which are involved in co-
operation between independent parties who may have different motives and interests, while at 
the same time allowing individual capabilities and knowledge to be exploited for the mutual 
benefit of all the parties”.  
 
As we see, contradictory claims/findings have been reported in the literature. On the one 
hand, control mechanisms can have negative effects on trust in later stages of a relationship 
where trust is well established (Free, 2008; Tomkins, 2001). Similarly, Dekker (2004) argued 
that trust can be damaged in cases where control mechanisms exceed what is necessary to 
safeguard the activities. On the other hand, other studies (Halinen et al., 1999; Vélez et al., 
2008) have shown that control mechanisms cannot damage trust if there is an expectation of 
the continuity in the relationship. While introducing additional control mechanisms could 
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damage trust when the ‘maximum’ level of confidence has been reached in a one-off 
relationship, if the relationship is open-ended and expected to continue, additional control 
mechanisms could contribute to the stability of the relationship and facilitate its continuing 
evolution (Halinen et al., 1999; Vélez et al., 2008). Similarly, Sako (1992) argued that in 
cases where partners show a willingness to continue their collaboration, for example through 
investments in systems which allow partners to share knowledge and technology, additional 
control mechanisms can further enhance competence trust. So, control mechanisms may 
generate the information that is required to strengthen competence trust and thereby 
contribute to the continuity of the relationship. Nevertheless, Vlaar et al. (2007) pointed out 
that although the trust/control dynamics might alter, we know little about how managers can 
intervene to ensure that trust and control do not degrade or escalate beyond desirable levels.  
 
From the above it seems that the findings of the literature are ambiguous and remain open to 
debate (Vélez et al., 2008). However, we do not see these different views of the relationship 
between trust and control as necessarily contradictory. Instead, we believe that the apparently 
ambiguous findings can be due to the different phases of maturity and collaboration in inter-
organisational relationships, as “trust and control do not automatically become a duality. 
Instead each organization goes through a process of institutionalizing trust-control duality” 
(Khodyakov, 2007, p. 17). This duality perspective enables us to analyse the shifting 
emphasis placed on trust and control over time. So, although trust and control may be 
complementary at certain times, the relative emphasis on control and trust may change over 
time. As Möllering (2005, p. 299) pointed out, the trust and control duality implies “not only 
a potential relationship between trust and control, but an inevitable connection and reflexive 
influence”. This motivated us to explore the dynamics of the trust/co trol nexus by studying 
the different phases in the process of supply chain restructuring.  
 
As mentioned earlier, to structure the analysis of our data we will draw on the supply chain 
maturity model (SSCM) of Berry et al. (2001), which identifies four distinct phases in the 
process of supply chain restructuring. In the first phase, the autonomous firm phase, the 
supply chain comprises essentially market-based arm’s length relationships (Cullen and 
Meira, 2010). In this phase there is little or no ‘familiarity’ between the organisations and the 
relationships are contract-based, with contracts awarded to the suppliers with the lowest bids 
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(Lamming, 1993). The second phase, the serial dependence phase, represents the beginning 
of a more collaborative relationship. Dominant or preferred suppliers are identified and 
encouraged to commit to the relationship by investing in the necessary productive capacity 
and management skills (Lamming, 1993). There is a focus on managing suppliers and supply 
chain management is given more strategic intent. The third phase, the reciprocal dependence 
phase, entails close collaboration with suppliers (Berry et al., 2000). The importance of close 
relationships with suppliers is increasingly recognised (Lamming, 1993), there is much 
sharing of information across organisational boundaries, and advanced management systems 
are used to manage the supply chain (Lockamy and McCormack, 2004). In the final phase, 
the mutual dependence phase, collaboration with suppliers has been established and the focus 
of attention now shifts to the development of a partnership and to the governance of the 
collaborative relationship. Collaboration is routine and firmly established performance 
measures are in place to manage the supply chain (Lockamy and McCormack, 2004).  
 
3. Research Design  
 
To study the relationship between trust and control in the various phases leading to supply 
chain maturity, we conducted an interpretive case study to provide the thick descriptions 
which are needed to generate in-depth understandings of this phenomenon (Berry and Otley, 
2004; Ferreira and Merchant, 1992). The case study has twin roles: to understand the 
practices of the company by drawing on the above concepts; and, at the same time, to use the 
case study to deepen our knowledge of the trust/control nexus. 
 
Interpretive research involves on-going reflection on the data. In the interpretive paradigm, 
researchers do not seek to control empirical phenomena, rather they try to “enrich people’s 
understanding of the meanings of their actions” (Chua, 1986, p. 615). Thus, the role of theory 
is to explain action. In interpretive accounting research, theory plays an important role and is 
both the input and output of an interpretative case study (Ryan et al., 2002; see also Scapens, 
2004). Interpretive research seeks to understand the studied phenomena in terms of existing 
theory, but through the research findings that theory may be “refined, modified or even 
rejected” (Ryan et al., 2002, p. 150).   
Page 9 of 47 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
 
 
10 
 
 
This paper is part of a larger research project.[2] In this larger project we started by exploring 
the governance of inter-organisational relationships as we particularly wanted to study 
accounting, performance measurement and control in an inter-organisational context. 
Initially, we gained access to the studied company and then began our data collection. The 
timing was fortuitous as we soon realised that the company was in the process of 
restructuring its supply chains. As we interviewed various people in the company and started 
to analyse our findings, it became clear that the relationship between trust and control was 
changing as the company moved through the various phases in its supply chain restructuring. 
As mentioned earlier, to provide a structure for our analysis of the phases of the supply chain 
restructuring we drew on the supply chain maturity model (SCMM) of Berry et al. (2000). 
Using the SCMM enabled us to study how the relationships between the parties and the 
trust/control nexus changed as the supply chain matured. Even though our study focused on 
supply chain restructuring, we would expect similar changes in other types of inter-
organisational relationships, as the relationships mature and the parties collaborate more 
closely. 
 
The subject of the case study is a company operating in the aerospace industry, which we 
refer to as AIR (to maintain confidentiality). Our fieldwork took place at the company’s 
largest manufacturing/assembly site in the UK, and focussed on the supply chain for a 
specific component used in the manufacturing process. Having access to AIR proved to be 
particularly interesting because of the characteristics of the aerospace industry. The aerospace 
industry is a knowledge-based industry with high quality products; it is subject to intense 
competition and extreme levels of complexity; and, most importantly, it has high rates of 
outsourcing. A prominent feature of the aerospace industry is the high interdependency, close 
linkages and long-term relationships between manufacturers and suppliers. In recent years, a 
significant challenge for the industry has been to improve its supply chains (Smith and 
Tranfield, 2005). The traditional supply chain, with simple buyer-supplier relationships, not 
only leads to production delays, but also limits product development. Thus, the industry has 
been seeking to restructure its supply chains and to increase collaboration with suppliers. Our 
case study aims to show how the relationship between trust and control evolves within such a 
supply chain restructuring process. Thus, our focus is on the organisation which is managing 
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its supply chain. Specifically, we are looking at an organisation which is going through a 
process of change in the way it manages its suppliers, rather than looking at the network of 
suppliers as a whole, or individual supply chain relationships.  
 
Our main data collection technique was semi-structured interviews. Between 2006 and 2009, 
during ten site visits, we conducted twenty interviews with employees directly involved in the 
specific supply chain we studied. We interviewed eleven senior managers, middle-level 
managers and accountants spanning various departments – i.e., finance, purchasing and 
operations (see Appendix). These interviews enabled us to understand their experiences in the 
different phases of the supply chain restructuring. The interviews typically lasted for one to 
two hours and were directly or indirectly related to the management of the studied supply 
chain. The interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed verbatim, with the 
exception of two interviews in which the interviewees did not want to be recorded and so 
detailed notes were made after those two interviews. We complemented the interviews with 
secondary data, such as relevant company documents (contracts, meeting agendas, 
scorecards, management reports and other formal documents). In addition, other data was 
collected from public sources, namely press releases, newspaper articles, investors’ 
presentations, and annual reports.  
 
Our study took place during and after the completion of the supply chain restructuring in 
AIR. For the purpose of this paper, we identified comments, events and issues which relate to 
the relationship between trust and control in the different phases in the SCMM. This enabled 
us to explore how trust and control change over time. The discussion during the interviews 
focussed primarily on the supply chain restructuring and the development of control 
mechanisms and accounting techniques. Specific questions were not asked about trust – 
instead we inferred levels of trust from the comments made and the procedures deployed, 
although at times some of the interviewees did specifically mention trust. However, to 
understand trust we have to look not only at what people say, but also at what they do; i.e., 
we have to look for “the subjective meanings that people attach to things” (Lukka, 2010, p. 
112).  
 
Page 11 of 47 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
 
 
12 
 
The restructuring of AIR’s supply chain began in 2004 following a critical consultant’s report 
(which will be described later). In this paper we focus more particularly on the changes that 
took place in the later phases of restructuring which were contemporaneous with our research 
(2006-2009). For the earlier phases we had to reconstruct how the supply chain had changed 
from people’s memories of those changes. The more detailed contemporaneous information 
enabled us to gain deeper insights into the later phases, and especially the final phase. As we 
will show below, the later phases are particularly interesting as AIR’s supply chain 
management team developed new and quite sophisticated control mechanisms which were 
intended to ‘formalise’ trust in a context where there was significant staff turnover. 
 
We recognise that in interpretive research the traditional criteria of reliability, validity and 
generalisability can be problematic and alternative criteria such as procedural reliability, 
authenticity/plausibility and transferability are more appropriate (see Parker and Northcott, 
2016; and also Ryan et al., 2002). In terms of procedural reliability, in this section we have 
set out our research design and methods of data collection and analysis. For example, data 
collected in (early) interviews were discussed in subsequent interviews in order to seek 
clarification and corroboration. Furthermore, both internal and external documentary 
information was used to corroborate our interpretation of the interviews. Also, NVivo was 
used to organise and code the data. We hope that in writing this paper we have demonstrated 
both the plausibility and authenticity of our study.3 Although our analysis was guided by the 
existing literature, it has to be acknowledged that the influence of the researchers cannot be 
excluded, and any interpretation of qualitative data is subject to data limitations and the 
complexities and limitations of the human mind (see McKinnon, 1988, pp. 37-39). As such 
the interpretation of the case study is ‘our’ interpretation, but it is grounded in the existing 
literature and based on multiple data sources. The challenge in presenting such an 
interpretation is to convince the reader that our interpretation makes sense and that it is based 
on appropriate evidence (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2007). This we seek to do in the 
following section. Finally, we emphasise that rather than seeking to generalise our specific 
findings to all supply chains, or even to all supply chains in the aerospace industry, we would 
argue that the social processes surrounding the trust/control nexus, which we study in this 
paper, are likely to be applicable in other supply chains and that the theoretical insights we 
will gain through this study are thereby transferable to other settings; as such we are making a 
theoretical generalisation (see Parker and Northcott, 2016, p.1111) . 
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5. Restructuring the AIR’s Supply Chain 
 
Background  
AIR is a leading UK-based company, which employs considerably more than 20,000 people 
globally.[4] It has numerous subsidiaries operating in different business segments, one of 
which is the aerospace industry. AIR can be described as a system integrator and its 
competitive advantage is the high quality of its products. Following the general trend in the 
aerospace industry to streamline supply chains and to increase collaboration with suppliers, in 
2004 AIR’s senior management team decided to restructure its supply chains in an attempt to 
improve its performance and to protect its competitive position. In this paper, we focus on the 
supply chain for an intermediate component in AIR’s principal products for the aerospace 
industry. AIR as the final assembler of the output is the ‘dominant partner’ within the studied 
supply chain. However, we should point out that although it is dominant, its intention in 
restructuring its supply chains was, not to take control, but to govern the supply chain 
through collaboration. It is the need for high quality products and the social and economic 
consequences of faulty products that drive its decisions. As we will see, it is difficult to 
change suppliers (or partners) in a mature supply chain when there is close collaboration 
between them and this increases the bargaining power of the smaller parties.  
 
Traditionally, AIR has dealt with suppliers on a project by project basis, where a project is for 
the supply, over a period of usually 3 to 5 years, of a particular part/component or type of 
material or service. As the relationships with suppliers moved towards partnerships, the 
definition of a project became rather vague because AIR’s relationships with its suppliers 
began to change. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that a transaction with a supplier is 
not for the supply of something at a specific point in time, but an agreement to provide the 
continuing supply over a period of time, according to an agreed schedule. The supply chain 
for the intermediate component we studied comprises both internal and external suppliers. 
Before the restructuring, as well as a large number of arm’s length relationships (in the region 
of five hundred), there were three joint ventures (JVs). As a result of the supply chain 
restructuring, the number of arm’s length relationships was reduced substantially (to 
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approximately forty) and those that remained evolved into much closer collaborations. The 
three JVs continued to be suppliers throughout the restructuring process, but they also 
underwent significant changes.  
 
The process of supply chain restructuring in AIR can be divided into three chronological 
periods which can be mapped onto the different phases of the supply chain maturity model 
(SCMM). These three periods are: prior to 2004 (autonomous firm); 2004-2006 (reciprocal 
dependence); and 2006 onwards (mutual dependence). However, 2004 represented a 
milestone in the supply chain restructuring and it can also be treated as a phase in the SCMM 
(serial dependence). The four phases are summarised in Table 1. The following sub-sections 
are organised according to the above chronological periods, and in each period we will use 
the SCMM to structure our discussion of the trust/control nexus. 
 
-----Insert Table 1 about here----- 
 
Early Stages: up to 2004 
The situation in AIR prior to 2004 can be categorised as the first phase of the SCMM – the 
autonomous firm phase (see Berry et al., 2000); where the supply chain comprises essentially 
market-based arm’s length relationships (Cullen and Meira, 2010) and inter-organisational 
relationships are generally unstructured and not very well defined. At that time AIR’s 
management was following the traditional style of purchasing and, as mentioned earlier, 
procurement was through one-off projects. As materials, parts, etc. were acquired through 
arm’s length relationships, and the individual projects were characterised by low asset 
specificity, it was quite easy to switch suppliers. In general, each project was allocated to the 
supplier with the lowest bid, a practice that is a common characteristic of the first phase of 
the SCMM (Lamming, 1993). During this phase the only control mechanism in place was the 
contract, hence performance was difficult to manage and predict, but nevertheless there was a 
positive expectation that suppliers would not behave opportunistically and would honour 
their contracts. This positive expectation led to the development of contractual trust. 
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When a new project was being negotiated a contract review took place prior to signing the 
contract. This contract review systematically considered all the necessary activities and 
defined the quality, delivery and cost requirements. However, although there was a positive 
expectation that the suppliers would honour the contract terms, trust was not explicitly 
considered. Furthermore, there was no distinction between suppliers who were external and 
those who were internal (viz., the joint ventures). Purchasing managers simply allocated the 
project to the suppliers that met AIR’s quality requirements and had the lowest cost. 
According to one purchasing manager (3):[5]  
If they [internal suppliers] are not as competitive, we outsource the work externally. 
So from the purchasing, commercial and supply chain perspectives, they [internal 
suppliers] must feature equal or better performance than the external. It’s got to be 
the way to make decisions based on quality, cost, delivery and responsiveness. You 
cannot assign the work internally just because of an ‘intimate’ relationship. 
 
When the contract review was complete an operational contract was signed. This set out all 
the requirements relating to the specific project, including the technical specifications, the 
price, manufacturing procedures, quality standards and delivery details. The normal length of 
a contract was 3 years, but this was not long enough to encourage suppliers to invest in new 
machines or new technology for the project. At the end of each contract, the supplier had to 
bid once again for a new project. AIR’s senior management team had previously decided to 
have such short contracts in order to ensure that it always worked with the lowest cost 
suppliers. As one senior manager (5) explained “you didn’t have any relationship with these 
people...you could look for different quotations to see if you could find someone who was a 
bit more competitive”. However, this approach did have drawbacks. According to a 
purchasing manager (4), the interaction with the suppliers was along the lines of “This is 
what I want. Make it for me”. As a result, suppliers had little influence over the product 
design, and this often resulted in a mismatch between the design and the manufacturing 
capability of suppliers.  
 
As is characteristic of this first phase of the SCMM, no specific performance measures were 
used (cf. Lockamy and McCormack, 2004), and the suppliers’ performance was only 
evaluated at the end of the contract – i.e., during the contract review for the next project. As 
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such, the contract was the only formal control mechanism in place and signing the contract 
carried with it an expectation, underpinned by the legal protections provided in contract law, 
that the supplier would honour the terms of the contract. According to Sako (1992) this 
expectation can be described as contractual trust, and this is the minimum level of trust 
needed to enter into a contract. Contractual trust will be built up during the contract review 
process and in the negotiations which take place prior to signing a contract.   
 
AIR’s actions illustrate that during the autonomous firm phase a company’s positive 
expectation of its supplier will initiate the relationship and lead to the development of 
contractual trust. In this early phase of the SCMM we saw that AIR’s managers had the 
minimum level of trust needed to enter a contractual transaction with its suppliers. This 
minimum level of trust provided a positive expectation that the supplier would honour the 
contract – thus, contractual trust reduced the uncertainty as it was underpinned by the existing 
institutional arrangements and, in particular, by the legal system. In practice, the legal system 
underpins the contractual trust which people have in market-based transactions. The presence 
of a legal system reduces the risk inherent in entering into a transaction and provides the basis 
for a minimum level of trust between the parties. It also provides a platform upon which trust 
can grow (Lane and Bachmann, 1997; Luhmann, 1979). However, in this phase the control 
system used to manage the supply chain was very simple – comprising just the contract. As 
contractual trust provided the basis for control, in this phase trust and control were 
complementary. Minimal trust initiated the transaction and control was underpinned by the 
contract. In this way, trust and control together led to uncertainty reduction.  
 
A milestone for change: 2004  
In 2004 a number of changes occurred in AIR, including the beginning of the restructuring of 
its supply chain. This restructuring had the aim of improving AIR’s supply chain 
performance and eventually its overall performance. Earlier, AIR’s management team had 
commissioned consultants to study how it (AIR) was perceived by both its customers and its 
suppliers, and the results were very disappointing, characterising AIR as ‘arrogant’. 
Consequently, it began restructuring its supply chains in order to put in place a new global 
supply chain strategy, which included a substantial reduction in the number of suppliers, 
identifying the major suppliers and developing close relationships with them. These actions 
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correspond to the second phase of the SCMM – the serial dependence phase, which 
represents the beginning of a more collaborative relationship and a focus on actively 
managing suppliers (see Berry et al., 2000). Major suppliers were identified and encouraged 
to invest in capacity and technology that would be beneficial for their business with AIR; this 
is typical of the serial dependence phase (Lamming, 1993; Lockamy and McCormack, 2004). 
Initially, no additional control mechanisms were introduced, but trust became more important 
than in the previous phase. As we will explain below, goodwill trust was a necessary 
condition for the identification of major suppliers and for the development of collaborative 
relationships with them. 
 
It was the consultants who recommended restructuring the supply chain. They had measured 
the satisfaction expressed by AIR’s customers and suppliers, analysed their experiences, and 
benchmarked both against AIR’s major competitors. The consultants pointed out that both 
customers and suppliers were very disappointed with AIR’s attitude and performance, with 
some suppliers indicating that they would reconsider working with AIR in the future. In view 
of the problems of changing suppliers in the aerospace industry, even though AIR is the 
dominant party in its supply chain, it had to react and improve these relationships. As a senior 
manager (5) explained: 
We were arrogant, we were short term, rather than medium and long term, we were 
constantly moving products to save unit price cost, but the total cost was actually 
more, because you had to pay to move components, you had to support it, you had to 
validate it, etc…So we had like an alcoholic moment, we thought we were socially 
drinking, and we were okay, but we actually had a problem and then it was pointed 
out to us that we were not very good at purchasing, we were not very good at 
relationship management, and we were not very good at working with our supply 
chain. 
 
Furthermore, suppliers also complained that their supply chain was too complicated with too 
many interfaces and points of contact, and this created confusion and delays. As a purchasing 
manager (3) pointed out:  
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One of the big criticisms that AIR received is that we didn’t use the suppliers’ 
expertise, knowledge and staff. On the contrary, we thought that we knew best. We 
were not satisfying our customers, mainly through supply chain delivery issues. 
Good performance didn’t necessarily equal more work, etc., and so that’s when a 
change in the focus was necessary.  
 
Having recognised the problems, AIR’s senior managers started restructuring its many and 
diverse supply chains. As another purchasing manager (4) explained, “we wanted to give 
more capabilities to the supply chain”. For the first time, they had strategic intentions for 
their suppliers. In a later interview the first purchasing manager (20) pointed out that: 
There was a plethora of relationships, because of the number of supply choices out 
there…However, technology requirements are increasing and there’s less and less 
people involved in it, so you have to initiate a partnership. 
 
Having analysed the feedback from the consulting company, as well as studying the 
expectations of the industry’s regulators, AIR’s senior managers developed a new global 
purchasing supply chain strategy in 2004. As a senior operations purchasing manager (5) 
explained: 
….to drive the business forward we need a smaller number of larger strategic 
relationships…our core business is original equipment and technology, managing 
supply chains is just a by-product of trying to do that, so we much prefer to have 
these organisations [first-tier suppliers] working with the supplier chains, organising 
them and delivering us components… Now the purchasing strategic direction is to go 
from approximately 500 suppliers per product down to 40. So, we now have to 
manage and work with the suppliers that had been put under pressure in the 
traditional purchasing world. But that is a conscious decision and it’s difficult, but 
that’s what we didn’t have. 
 
In order to reduce the number of suppliers and to create closer relationships with fewer major 
(i.e., first-tier) suppliers, the new strategy was divided into three steps (see Table 2). In the 
first step the priority was to rationalise the supply base by ‘exiting’ poor performing suppliers 
– i.e., stopping working with them. In the second step the focus was on developing close 
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relationships with the major suppliers. The final step was to develop a system of integrated 
accountability for the major (first-tier) suppliers who, in turn, would be responsible for 
managing their own (second-tier, third-tier, etc.) suppliers. By reducing the number of 
suppliers and developing closer and better relationships with the remaining (major) suppliers, 
a more flexible supply chain was created, with increasing overall performance. 
 
-----Insert Table 2 about here----- 
 
The identification of major (or preferred) suppliers is typical of the serial dependence phase 
(Lamming, 1993; Lockamy and McCormack, 2004). For AIR, a ‘major supplier’ is not 
necessarily defined in terms of the frequency or volume of projects, but it is a supplier who is 
important for the continuity of the manufacturing process. For such suppliers it is important 
to have a positive expectation that they would not act opportunistically and to display an open 
commitment and reciprocity. As the parties communicate their intentions through relational 
signals, the trust which is necessary for AIR to start to work more closely with the selected 
suppliers, and thereby to encourage further collaboration, is gradually built. As an operations 
manager (9) pointed out: “we need to trust them that they won’t use the same technology with 
other customers”. The aim during this phase was to enter into close, long-term relationships 
in which the suppliers would become involved from the early stages of the design process 
and would share investment and technical know-how. Consequently, trust was a necessary 
condition in the choice of these major suppliers. As a purchasing manager (4) explained: “the 
existence or not of trust changed our negotiation strategy – meaning our willingness to share 
more or less information with them”. Thus, the chosen suppliers must have a moral 
commitment to the maintenance of the relationship, be willing to offer help when it is needed, 
and not take unfair advantage of any situation that may arise.[6] As such, trust is seen as a 
“cognitive state that generates positive expectations of the abilities, intentions and integrity of 
the other” (van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2010, p. 94).  
 
AIR’s actions in this phase illustrate that goodwill trust provides a platform upon which 
collaboration can be built and facilitates the implementation of (initial) control mechanisms. 
AIR reduced the number of its suppliers and continued working only with those suppliers 
which its managers thought likely to possess the motivation and capabilities needed to 
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develop a collaborative relationship. So goodwill trust was needed to initiate closer 
collaborative relationships. In this phase, in AIR, we did not see the implementation of 
additional control mechanisms to safeguard behaviour (i.e., in addition to the contract). In 
other words, although goodwill trust facilitated the initiation and development of 
collaborative relationships, it was not until the next phase that additional control mechanisms 
were introduced – as we will see below. In the current phase trust was built and this 
facilitated closer collaboration, but as there were no additional control mechanisms beyond 
the contract, trust acted in place of (i.e., as a substitute for) control. As such, trust and control 
can be seen as a dualism. However, this may be due to the way we present our case study 
findings, as there is no unambiguous distinction between the different phases.  
 
Restructuring of the Supply Chain: 2004 – 2006  
As we saw above, in 2004 the supply chain restructuring began with the development of a 
new global supply chain strategy. Initially, the number of suppliers was reduced significantly, 
and then AIR’s managers developed much closer and longer-term relationships with those 
that were retained. During the subsequent couple of years, AIR continued to implement its 
supply chain strategy by introducing new initiatives. First, it entered into long-term 
agreements (LTAs) with its external suppliers, and second it made a number of changes to the 
management of its JVs. The actions taken by AIR during 2004-2006 fit the reciprocal 
dependence phase of the SCMM (see Berry et al., 2000). The focus was on increasing 
collaboration with preferred suppliers, which is characteristic of the reciprocal dependence 
phase (see Lamming, 1993). Furthermore, in this phase, there is typically more information 
sharing across organisational boundaries and cross-organisational teams are formed to 
manage the supply chain. AIR’s senior managers introduced new performance measures into 
the JVs and they initiated continuous improvement programmes – actions which again are 
typical of the reciprocal dependence phase (see Lockamy and McCormack, 2004). In this 
phase control and trust become interactive. During this phase the strengthening of goodwill 
trust facilitates the implementation of new control mechanisms, which in turn support the 
development of competence trust – as will be described below. 
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By working more closely with its major suppliers, AIR was seeking to take advantage of their 
expertise and to promote supplier involvement in the early design stages. As the traditional 
arm’s length relationships were no longer suitable, AIR signed LTAs with its major suppliers, 
typically with an average life of ten years. The LTAs provided legal protection to both sides 
and were the contractual basis for close long-term collaboration. During the period covered 
by an LTA, AIR and the supplier could collaborate on several projects and share knowledge, 
technology and the procurement of raw materials. For each project, a separate operational 
contract would be signed between AIR and the supplier.[7] In this reciprocal dependence 
phase the character of the projects and the context in which they were allocated changed. In 
the earlier phases the projects were quite separate and independent, but in this phase a project 
was generally just one element within a LTA. Whereas previously the (operational) contracts 
were used to control the projects and to provide the legal basis for the relationships between 
AIR and its suppliers, in this phase the operational contract was used to set out the 
specifications for individual projects, while the LTA was used to control the long-term 
relationships. As individual suppliers typically had more than one operational contract, there 
was a need to develop new control mechanisms to manage these relationships. During this 
phase, a new ‘suite’ of contracts emerged, comprising an ‘early supply’ contract and a non-
disclosure agreement. However, despite the use of these new contracts to safeguard 
behaviour, trust was still important. As a purchasing manager (14) explained:  
The non-disclosure agreement offers the legal protection. We do a lot of them. But 
practically if they [the suppliers] want to disclose it, they can. And there is nothing 
you can do to stop it. You just have to trust them. That’s another reason why I need 
to develop better relationships with our suppliers, so they won’t get annoyed and tell 
our competitors our practices. 
 
By entering into LTAs, the aim was to create an environment which would promote 
collaboration and reduce the uncertainty and lack of security that suppliers had complained 
about in their earlier responses to the consultants – mentioned above. The suppliers could 
now begin to see the future of their relationship with AIR and the potential for further work 
to be allocated to them. In our interviews within AIR, carried out in late 2006 and early 2007, 
interviewees talked about “relationship values”, and although there was no explicit discussion 
of trust, expressions like “credibility”, “openness” and “being able to rely on someone” were 
used. After entering into LTAs, suppliers were more willing to invest in technology, facilities 
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and people because of the commitment of AIR and the longer-term contracts that they had 
signed. As both parties were working more closely together over rather longer periods, they 
developed a joint vision and a familiarity with each other that strengthened goodwill trust. As 
a senior operations purchasing manager (5) explained:  
 High technology industries, such as the aerospace industry, normally need 
significant investment. So when our suppliers need to borrow money to buy new 
machines, or new facilities, they need to give to their banks a longer justification. So 
you [AIR] then have to make a very balanced decision between: do you do very 
short-term tactical purchase orders; or do you build for the longer, more stable future, 
and have a trusting relationship that says that you will work with these suppliers to 
make sure they’re low [cost], and they’re very competitive.  
 
This closer collaboration with suppliers created the need for more information to be available 
before operational contracts were signed. In addition to the cost, quality and delivery issues 
that were discussed during the contract review process,[8] AIR started to perform SWOT[9] 
analyses to gather information about the suppliers’ technological capabilities and capacity to 
perform the project, the availability of the required materials, and the related risks. 
Furthermore, subjective criteria such as confidentiality, management attitude, ability to 
manage lower-tier suppliers and financial viability (through a financial assessment of the 
supplier) were all discussed before operational contracts were signed. As a purchasing 
manager (4) explained:  
Before we source a project to a supplier, we go through a contract review process, 
where we invite key stakeholders and we present what the Purchasing view is...we 
are looking at a supplier and we ask the Supplier Intelligence Team to do a financial 
health check on them. If someone comes back as red then that means that we won’t 
source to him.  
 
Even though the information gathered through the contract review process was potentially 
quite sensitive, (according to our interviewees) the suppliers were willing to disclose this 
information. This willingness is probably due to goodwill trust which was stronger during 
this phase because of the close collaboration between AIR and the suppliers. With the 
exception of the financial assessment, this information was monitored annually to identify 
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any changes in the suppliers’ situation. Having this information meant that AIR’s team was 
able to assess the suppliers’ capabilities to perform their allocated projects. Thus, this 
additional information enabled AIR’s managers to build competence trust in the suppliers; 
i.e., trust that the suppliers have the capabilities necessary to perform satisfactorily the tasks 
allocated to them (Sako, 1992). It seems here that there is a complementary relationship 
between trust and control; where control builds trust, and in particular competence trust. 
 
A significant element of the supply chain restructuring process during this phase focused on 
the JVs. Until that time, there had been limited interaction between AIR and the JVs, partly 
due to the geographical distance between them, and all the JVs had been reporting losses. 
When AIR became more involved during this phase, its immediate aim was not only to 
improve the JVs’ financial positions, but also to change their manufacturing and strategic 
goals. Consequently, initially the focus was on the way the JVs were managed as entities, 
rather than specifically focussing on their operational contracts. The JVs needed to have a 
strategic focus/orientation, and to recognise that a balanced approach, combining 
performance effectiveness and high quality products, could be profitable and secure their 
long-term success by meeting their customers’ requirements. To achieve this, management 
teams in AIR began to have a much closer involvement in the JVs; developing mutual 
interests through more frequent interactions with AIR, and support from AIR’s own staff 
when needed, thereby working much more closely together despite the physical distances. As 
a financial controller (6) explained: “they [the JVs] now take a lot of our best people, 
business methods engineers; they all go out to those places [the JV sites] to help them”. 
Transparency was further improved as the JVs started to become involved in the early design 
and manufacturing stages. These changes improved the relationship between the teams in 
both parties and led to the development of goodwill trust. Improved personal relationships, 
together with goodwill trust, was seen as crucial for the management of the JVs. As a senior 
manager (13) pointed out:  
You have to have trust. Both the management team and the shareholders spent time 
and effort to try to make sure that both parties are aware of things. You have to have 
good trust, from the Board level to the General Manager, to the people actually 
supporting it and looking after the JV. If trust breaks down, then you start getting 
problems. 
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Goodwill trust was particularly important where there was distance between the parties. For 
example, in one of the JVs, where the Chinese government owned the majority of the equity, 
language barriers and cultural distance created many problems in the day-to-day operations of 
the business. As a financial controller (6) illustrated: 
We had to build a lot of trust between ourselves. They [the JV] were extremely 
secretive in what they do and it was quite hard to get information out of them. For 
example, they had the tendency not to speak English when it suited them. So it 
required a lot of bridge-building to get to a level of understanding and trust. But once 
we got that, they were very good in providing information to us and we only had to 
ask them once. They are very quick and responsive now. 
 
During this phase, AIR’s managers saw the JVs as a way of developing their own ideas and 
processes, and in particular as a way of learning and testing the supply chain restructuring 
process. They introduced new control mechanisms for monitoring supply chain performance 
into the JVs first, before extending them to the external suppliers. As a manager (7) 
responsible for JVs explained: 
The idea originally was to pilot it with the JVs and then any mistakes and any 
learning points…, we could then take them and work with the other suppliers. It 
wasn’t because we wanted to do the JVs first, other than the fact that you don’t wash 
your dirty laundry in public. You want to make mistakes with someone in house and 
then you can learn from them and then take it to others. That’s just the reality. 
 
The intention was to improve the control of the JVs through the application of AIR’s 
domestic measures; i.e., its financial and operational key performance indicators (KPIs) (see 
Table 3). All the JVs had to submit a monthly business review pack which included these 
KPIs, together with reviews of sales and marketing operations, together with an income 
statement and a statement of financial position. One result of this process was an 
improvement in the JVs’ performance and consequently in their profitability. This frequent 
flow of information helped to overcome obstacles related to the physical distance between the 
partners. Furthermore, there was increased assurance that the JVs had the required 
capabilities to perform their allocated projects. Thus, this information helped to build 
competence trust in the JVs. As the Financial Director for Operations (13) explained:  
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What really made me apply the KPIs to the JVs was to provide a strategic focus – to 
try actually to realign what they are making with what they should be making in 
accordance to AIR’s strategy for that JV.  
 
A senior purchasing manager (12) commented on the benefits of applying the new control 
mechanisms to the JVs as follows: 
That focus has allowed us to move the P&L [income statement] in the right direction 
because we can see excess inventory or sales. The profit increased and people there 
had a better understanding of what they are doing. 
 
-----Insert Table 3 about here----- 
 
Getting the JVs to accept and implement the new control mechanisms was not 
straightforward, as such controls were not part of the JV agreements. Consequently, the JVs’ 
management teams and the other parents had to be persuaded of the benefits of using these 
control mechanisms. Because of their poor performance, and also the previous lack of proper 
management support from AIR, the JVs did not initially trust AIR, and there was a concern 
that, although the new control mechanisms might benefit AIR, they might not be beneficial 
for the JVs themselves. Thus, goodwill trust was needed – i.e., trust that AIR was not acting 
opportunistically – for the JVs to accept and implement the new control mechanisms. 
However, over time AIR managers were able to persuade the JV managers that these control 
mechanisms would improve the performance. As goodwill trust started to develop between 
individuals from the JVs and AIR, managers of the JV became more willing to supply the 
information to AIR and also to use AIR’s KPIs to control their own operations.[10] As a senior 
manager (13) pointed out: 
I don’t think we had to force the KPIs on any JV. I think that was because we 
managed to persuade them that this is a mix that makes sense, it’s a balanced 
scorecard approach. Also, because they trusted us, because we are a big 
manufacturing company, they expected us to have the best practices…Now the KPIs 
are always displayed on their notice boards. 
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AIR’s actions in the reciprocal dependence phase illustrate the complex complementary 
relationship between trust and control, where trust builds control and control builds trust. The 
increasing collaboration strengthened goodwill trust between the partners. The development 
of goodwill trust between AIR and its suppliers facilitated the implementation of additional 
control mechanisms, and subsequently the implementation of these control mechanisms built 
competence trust. In this reciprocal dependence phase, collaboration became more intense as 
AIR entered into LTAs with its major suppliers. With these longer-term agreements in place 
suppliers gained confidence in their relationships with AIR, and consequently they were 
willing to invest in new technology, facilities and people. More frequent interaction created 
familiarity and empathy, which in turn strengthened goodwill trust. This goodwill trust made 
suppliers willing to disclose sensitive information and facilitated the use of additional control 
mechanisms (initially in the JVs). The additional information gathered through the contract 
review process, such as information about the suppliers’ technical capabilities and financial 
situation, led to the development of competence trust. In this way, the additional control 
mechanisms provided the information needed to maintain and further develop trust. 
Previously, AIR’s managers had only been concerned about the suppliers’ ability to meet the 
terms of the individual contracts. Now, however, they were interested in the suppliers’ 
broader competences to contribute to the performance of the supply chain. Moreover, 
competence trust in the JVs was further developed through the monthly financial and 
operational data which the JVs provided. The above discussion illustrates the duality of trust 
and control in the reciprocal dependence phase, where the one cannot exist without the other. 
Goodwill trust enables additional controls to be implemented and those controls help to build 
competence trust as the relationships develop. 
 
Final Changes: 2006 – onwards  
Having completed the initial steps in the implementation of its new global supply chain 
strategy (see Table 2), AIR began the final step in 2006, with the development of an 
integrated system of accountability for its major suppliers. This included formalising 
procedures for the procurement of commodities and the management of suppliers. 
Collaboration with suppliers had by then already been established and the focus of attention 
shifted to the development of a partnership model and to the governance of the relationship. 
AIR’s actions during this period are in line with the final phase of the SCMM – the mutual 
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dependence phase (see Berry et al., 2000). This partnership model sought to identify mutual 
interests and establish mutual respect between AIR and its suppliers (cf. Lamming, 1993). 
Furthermore, advanced supply chain management practices, which transfer responsibility 
without legal ownership (Lockamy and McCormack, 2004), were put in place. AIR 
introduced a range of control and performance measurement mechanisms, including a 
supplier scorecard and a relationship profile tool. These mechanisms not only generated 
technical information, which increases competence trust, but also developed ‘soft elements’, 
such as mutual respect, common values and long-term integrity, which strengthen goodwill 
trust and contribute to the continuity of the relationship.  
 
AIR’s new supply chain strategy now provides clearly defined and well documented 
procedures for the management of relationships with its suppliers and for the procurement of 
raw materials and intermediate commodities. These procedures are divided into two parts: (a) 
the development of commodity strategies and (b) the development of supplier strategies. The 
commodity strategy, which replaces the previous purchasing policy, plans the procurement of 
each commodity for the next 10 years; i.e., the procurement of raw materials, components, 
services, etc. Amongst other things the commodity strategy includes the make-buy decision 
for each commodity and identifies potential suppliers when the decision is to ‘buy’ – i.e., to 
allocate projects to suppliers. 
 
With a commodity strategy in place, the supplier strategy is developed jointly by AIR and its 
supplier(s). It seeks to align the strategies of both parties in order to identify, develop and 
deliver the long-term business objectives of both. By promoting the early involvement of 
suppliers, issues related to the supplier’s capabilities and available technology, facilities and 
people can be addressed. Where necessary technology can be shared and agreements made 
about new investments required to provide the capacity needed to meet AIR’s requirements. 
By jointly developing the supplier strategy, the suppliers feel valued by, and committed to, 
AIR. This has a positive impact on goodwill trust between the partners, and it further 
strengthens the competence trust that AIR’s managers have in its suppliers. As such, this 
mechanism signals trustworthiness between the partners. As a finance manager (7) explained:  
The supplier strategy is something that we say we want from the supplier and they 
say they want from the customer [AIR] ... then we get together and we agree a joint 
vision for the next 10 years... Does the supplier have the capability to deliver? What 
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do they need to do? What technology, facilities, training or personnel [are needed] to 
get that capability? 
 
Following the successful introduction of new control mechanisms for the JVs (described in 
the previous section), similar control mechanisms were extended to all the suppliers; 
specifically, a quality control system, a supplier scorecard, target costing and a relationship 
profile tool. The quality control system, which is termed the Supplier Advanced Business 
Relationship (SABRe), is intended to support the relationships and to develop mutual 
commitment. This is now an important tool for AIR since, as the final assembler, it is 
responsible for the overall performance of its final product. SABRe sets out the business 
requirements for suppliers in terms of four measures, which AIR benchmarks against other 
suppliers; namely quality, cost, delivery and responsiveness. These requirements are 
regularly discussed with suppliers and their achievements are recorded on the supplier 
scorecard (see Table 4). A scorecard is constructed for every supplier when its supplier 
strategy is designed, and it is updated every six months. According to our interviewees, the 
suppliers are willing to disclose the required information because of the close collaboration 
they now have – in other words, because of the goodwill trust which now exists between 
them. When necessary, AIR will work with suppliers to improve their performance. The 
regular discussions of the supplier scorecards are a two-way process. As a senior purchasing 
manager (12) explained: “...we start by listening to the supplier and we will go through what 
is important for them first”. This enables suppliers to discuss openly their concerns and issues 
with AIR. As such, the supplier scorecards can help to reinforce (or otherwise) the belief that 
the suppliers continue to have the capabilities needed to perform satisfactorily the projects 
which are allocated to them. Thus, this mechanism contributes to the development of 
competence trust which supports the continuity of the relationship.  
 
-----Insert Table 4 about here----- 
 
The early involvement of suppliers, as well as the creation of partnerships with suppliers, led 
to the recognition that AIR’s cost management techniques needed improvement. As the 
Financial Director of Operations (13) commented: “I think that AIR was traditionally naïve in 
managing cost and now we are looking at it very seriously”. The involvement of suppliers in 
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the early stages of the design and manufacture of components has enabled target costing to be 
introduced. The discussion now starts from the expected selling price and AIR’s finance and 
procurement teams work with the suppliers to build agreed target costs. The process of 
building target costs has improved communication and information flows at both the cross-
functional and the cross-organisational levels. Having target costs in place, which are 
developed jointly with the suppliers, gives AIR much greater control over suppliers’ costs 
and enables it to form realistic expectations about whether suppliers can meet the agreed 
price. This in turn helps to strengthen competence trust. Furthermore, as the approach taken 
in these control mechanisms is to ensure than the suppliers’ interests are being achieved, 
goodwill trust is also enhanced. 
 
In this mutual dependence phase, AIR’s managers seek to develop supportive, mutually 
committed relationships (cf. Berry et al., 2000). To promote long-term partnerships with its 
suppliers, the focus is on encouraging two-way communication in order to improve 
transparency and to build confidence in each other. To do this there is a need to look beyond 
the traditional technical measures (such as cost, quality and delivery) and to give attention to 
such soft elements as mutual respect, common values, long-term integrity and so on (as 
mentioned earlier). However, the expression ‘soft elements’ was not used by the interviewees 
in AIR; instead, some used the more light hearted expression ‘pink and fluffy’. As a senior 
purchasing manager (12) explained:  
…to get a better long-term view, the characteristics we need to focus on are not 
always price, not always quality, not always delivery; but the relationship value is 
one of the assets we needed to be more focused on... I think it has to be done in a 
measured way because a lot of the importance of the collaboration is to have a strong 
relationship and it takes time to set that up…You formulate relationships by doing 
work outside of the day-to-day transactional side…what I call ‘pink and fluffy’. 
When we arrange a meeting I want for the first hour to talk about our relationship, 
about our common values. While my supply chain manager argued that no, we need 
to tell them to improve their deliveries, etc. I disagree with him. I am going to have a 
pink and fluffy session; we need to bring the teams together…working on the 
relationship to get an openness to say what your values are. I could show you 
statistically that the delivery was linked to relationship management, rather than the 
transactional side. 
Page 29 of 47 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
 
 
30 
 
 
Nevertheless, building good personal relationships between the people involved is not 
sufficient on its own for the successful governance of the relationships in the long term as the 
aerospace industry is characterised by high staff turnover. There is always the possibility that 
the benefits of good inter-personal relationships will be lost in the handover when someone 
leaves. The same senior purchasing manager (12) argued that there is a need for a more 
‘detailed structure’. Reflecting on a conversation he had had with a colleague, he explained: 
Well how have we done that? What’s the structure? He’ll just say that it’s his 
personal energy, that it’s his personal way of driving issues, that it’s his networking 
with senior people within AIR. So when you go, what happens? And he’ll say ‘oh 
well, maybe somebody else will pick it up’. But it is within my portfolio now, but 
where’s the governance structure, where’s the protocols, where’s the framework for 
management? He says, ‘well, I’ll take you out, I’ll introduce you to them’. So I think 
we have relied on very good individuals to generate direction, and their personal 
energies to increase performance, but what we haven’t been very good at, until now, 
is putting in rigour, structure and a framework. 
 
Consequently, senior managers have attempted to build a structure to promote the openness, 
honesty and trust that good personal relationships require. With the help of consultants, the 
relationship profile tool was developed. This tool seeks to set out the structures upon which a 
good relationship can be built, independently of the specific individuals involved. As a 
purchasing manager (20) explained: 
The first pilot was done with a big supplier with a really problematic relationship. 
That was one reason. And also, we didn’t want any bias from our end. We had a 
completely neutral, independent person and they [the external consultant] produced a 
series of reports, some on what the supplier sees that we don’t see, and some on what 
we see that the supplier doesn’t see, and then a de-sensitisation that everyone sees 
and goes in, and they [the consultants] basically decided if it’s a strategic match. 
Then we’ve got our version, which we don’t have to pay for. So with little suppliers 
we’ve got basically what we did with the external consultants, a shortened version, 
but if it’s a big spend we’ll go halves with the supplier. 
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So the relationship profile tool was initially developed to improve a poor relationship with a 
major supplier, but when managers realised its benefits, the tool was introduced across the 
whole supply chain. The relationship profile tool is completed jointly by AIR and the 
supplier, and provides an opportunity for both parties to identify problematic issues and 
together decide on improvement plans. It is more complex and more sophisticated than the 
supplier scorecard, mainly because it focuses on the social aspects of the relationship, which 
are difficult to quantify. It addresses such soft elements as mutual respect and mutual benefit, 
transparent processes, collaboration, trustworthiness, relationship management, long-term 
integrity and two-way communication (Table 5 illustrates the categories). This tool gives an 
objective measure which states quantifiably what the relationship with a supplier is like. Each 
partner knows what to expect from the other, and through continuing interaction they try to 
achieve these expectations. Each party seeks to understand and document the other party’s 
needs and expectations. By doing so, the relationship profile tool is intended to help maintain 
these relationships when someone from either party leaves. As such, the relationship profile 
tool aims to remove the uncertainty and to accelerate the process of developing inter-personal 
trust between the new people. By documenting experiences, the relationship profile tool sets 
out clear expectations. As a purchasing manager (20) commented: 
This tool gives an objective measure that says quantifiably what our relationship 
[with the supplier] is like. So someone might say that he has a cracking relationship 
with Supplier A, whom he deals with and I might be dealing with a different person 
[from that supplier] and have a rubbish relationship. So, someone says to the client 
‘What’s your relationship like with Supplier A?’ ‘Brilliant’; me, ‘Rubbish’. So you 
need an objective measure. What’s your relationship like with Supplier A? Well 
according to the profiling tool I’ve got this percent, because here’s a document that 
says quantifiably what our relationship is like. 
 
---Insert Table 5 about here--- 
 
The relationship profile tool comprises an actual score and a desired score on a 1-4 scale, 
where 1 reflects least integration of the two parties and 4 the most. There is space for 
creativity – i.e. flexibility – in this category. AIR and the suppliers agree on the principles 
and the desired score, so they each develop their ways of working together. In cases where 
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the desired state of the relationship is not achieved, immediate action can be taken to improve 
the relationship. So for example, if the two partners decide that the relationship currently 
scores 2 regarding their long-term integrity, whilst the desired score is 4 (see Table 6), they 
will draw up an action plan setting out what is needed to improve the problematic areas. This 
will then be followed by six-monthly reviews to verify that the improvement plans are being 
implemented.  
 
---Insert Table 6 about here--- 
 
The relationship profile tool seeks to harmonise expectations and to support interactions by 
providing guidelines for recognising necessary actions and evaluating their results. The aim is 
to provide the stability and standardisation which are necessary to give some protection 
against breakdowns in trust. It provides a template for building and maintaining trust, and 
thereby enables trust to persist across groups and over time.  
 
AIR’s actions in the mutual dependence phase reveal the implementation of mechanisms that 
aim to promote communication and to signal trustworthiness. The development of trust is 
affected by the partners’ abilities to ‘read’ each other and to signal trustworthiness (Carson et 
al., 2003; Vosselman and van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). This can be seen particularly in the 
development of the relationship profile tool. The control mechanisms which have been 
implemented generate the information required to strengthen competence trust and thereby 
contribute to the continuity of the relationship. These control mechanisms have led to more 
sharing of information (including accounting, technical and operational information). The 
goodwill trust, which was built up in the earlier phases, can explain the willingness of 
suppliers to share this information and also the successful implementation of the new control 
mechanisms. These control mechanisms, e.g., the supplier scorecard and target costing, have 
allowed managers within AIR to strengthen competence trust in its suppliers. Furthermore, 
both the supplier strategy and the relationship profile tool have strengthened goodwill trust 
and maintained good relationships with suppliers, even after individuals directly involved in 
the relationship have left. In the mutual dependence phase, as in the previous phase, we can 
see the duality of trust and control, as existing goodwill trust facilitates the use of additional 
control mechanisms, which in turn further strengthen competence trust. So, in this context 
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additional controls do not damage trust, rather they strengthen it and contribute to the 
continuity of the relationship. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
In this paper we have shown that the relationship between trust and control changed over 
time, specifically as the studied organisation moved through the different phases of its supply 
chain restructuring. Furthermore, we noted a shift in the relationship between trust/control 
from a dualism to a duality as the supply chain matured. In the early phases of the SCMM the 
relationship between trust and control was relatively simple and straightforward. However, as 
the supply chain moved into the more mature phases, the relationships became more 
complex, and trust and control seemed to inevitably become more interconnected, interactive 
and reflective – a duality. Looking at AIR’s supply chain before it was restructured, a 
minimum level of trust was needed for a transaction (Arrow, 1974) – i.e., what Nooteboom 
(2002) calls thin trust – and the use of the contract as a control mechanism led to the 
development of contractual trust (Sako, 1992). Hence, trust and control were complements, 
and the relationship between trust and control could be characterised as a dualism.[11] As the 
supply chain restructuring got underway and there were increasing interactions between AIR 
and its suppliers, goodwill trust developed and this facilitated the implementation of other 
control mechanisms, beyond the contract. As the collaboration became more intense and the 
relationship more important to the partners, goodwill trust was not sufficient on its own and 
additional control mechanisms were needed both to promote further collaboration and to 
safeguard behaviour. Here, we saw the role of control, not only in monitoring and 
safeguarding behaviour (as the contract does), but also in producing the information needed 
to promote further collaboration and commitment, and subsequently to enhance trust. Over 
time, familiarity and collaboration strengthened goodwill trust, and facilitated the 
implementation of new control mechanisms, such as the supplier strategy, the supplier 
scorecards, target costing techniques and the relationship profile tool. The information 
generated by these mechanisms further developed competence trust (Sako, 1992). As such, 
trust builds control and control builds trust (Vosselman and van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). 
The duality means that trust assumes the existence of control and control assumes the 
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existence of trust, and furthermore it is not feasible to have one without the other (Möllering, 
2005). 
 
It is well documented that organisations cannot trust, but individuals who are members of an 
organisation can trust other “individuals, organisations, institutions and systems” 
(Nooteboom, 2002, p. 8). Inter-organisational trust describes “the extent to which 
organizational members have a collectively held trust orientation toward the partner firm, 
which is quite different from saying that organisations trust each other” (Zaheer et al., 1998, 
p. 143). As such, inter-organisational trust is held at the individual level, but individuals can 
be trusted because they work for a particular organisation – not as individuals per se. If they 
move from that organisation they will not necessarily continue to be trusted. Our findings 
document a distinct attempt to move from inter-personal trust relationships to inter-
organisational trust relationships. We observed an attempt to disembed trustworthiness from 
the individual relationships and to maintain trust over the long periods of time which are 
involved in the development of partnerships.  By doing so, AIR hopes to secure the benefits 
of a trusting relationship despite personnel changes. A shift from inter-personal to inter-
organisational trust can occur if the representative’s conduct is viewed as typical of the 
organisation’s conduct (Doney and Cannon, 1997). Kroeger (2011) observed similar 
behaviours in the UK book publishing industry, where a group of managers reduced their 
reliance on traditional individualised inter-personal relationships (between editor and author 
for example) by creating a more formalised approach to trust building. He questioned 
whether the organisation as an entity can be the subject of trust (p. 8), and concluded that “the 
organization, as a distinguishable entity, will only be truly consequential as a subject of trust 
if there is a degree of stability in the way action is organized over time” (p. 9).  
 
Nevertheless, we do not see an organisation as a subject, but as an object of trust. In AIR, we 
saw the development of the relationship profile tool as a formalised approach to trust building 
which facilitates the development of an impersonal and quantified form of trust. The 
relationship profile tool seeks to maintain trust as specific individuals come and go, but 
nevertheless aims to retain trust at an individual level. As discussed above, inter-
organisational trust remains at the individual level. Our findings indicate that it was the lack 
of consistency and structure that led to the development of the relationship profile tool. This 
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might have been particularly intense in AIR because of high staff turnover, geographical 
distance, and the complex supply chain. The relationship profile tool aimed to achieve 
consistency and standardisation across the entire supply chain. 
 
The approach that we have adopted in this paper does not distinguish between the different 
partners, as the supply chain as a whole was the unit of analysis. Nevertheless, we need to 
acknowledge that not all members of the supply chain achieve the same levels of individual 
or organisational trust due to, among others constraints, their geographical distance. 
Geographical proximity of firms can encourage the development of inter-organisational trust 
due to frequent face-to-face communication (Dyer and Chu, 2000; Lane and Bachmann, 
1998). Still, organisations may trust their most important partners irrespectively of where the 
partners are located due to the many and repeated transactions between them (Bönte, 2008). 
In the case of AIR, the attempt to formalise trust building through the use of the relationship 
profile tool was prompted, not only by the desire to maintain trust despite high levels of staff 
turnover, but also to overcome the obstacles posed by geographical distance.  
 
A further point to note is that control mechanisms can fulfil a dual role. In AIR the control 
mechanisms were used not only to constrain (or safeguard) behaviour, but also to facilitate 
collaboration and contribute to the continuity of the relationship. Before AIR’s supply chain 
restructuring, its control system was quite simple, with the contract the only mechanism used 
to constrain behaviour. However, as AIR moved through the various phases of its supply 
chain restructuring, the constraining role of the control mechanism(s) became less important 
and, instead, control was used to jointly enable the parties to contribute to the relationship. In 
the later phases the contract (and possibly other control mechanisms) continued to act as a 
constraining mechanism(s), but other controls also acted as enabling/facilitating mechanisms. 
  
In this paper we have drawn upon the SCMM of Berry et al. (2000) to analyse our case. 
However, there are some notable differences between AIR’s supply chain, particularly in the 
mutual dependence phase, and the SCMM. According to Berry et al. (2000), in the mutual 
dependence phase there is a ‘partnership’ between the parties (i.e., between the supplier and 
the buyer), as both have equal power. In this phase, even though AIR emphasised their 
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mutual interests and involved its suppliers in the product design and the early development 
stages of manufacturing, AIR nevertheless retained a dominant role in the relationship. 
Although there was collaboration, and the character of the relationships with its suppliers had 
changed, AIR remained in control and set the boundaries. So, even though the suppliers are 
more involved in the process, it is a process that is largely controlled by AIR. There are 
important institutional reasons for this – especially given the nature of the industry. AIR is 
responsible for the final products and is accountable to customers, governments and the 
general public. If there are problems in its supply chain, which lead to defects in its products, 
AIR has to deal with the economic and social consequences, and these could include criminal 
as well as civil legal action, commercial penalties and loss of reputation. Consequently, 
controlling quality is crucial for AIR. As such, there cannot be an equal partnership between 
AIR and its suppliers. Although Berry et al. (2000) developed their SCMM from a study in 
the UK manufacturing industry, the mutual dependence phase may not, in all cases, take the 
form of the partnership model which they describe. Such a partnership may be impossible in 
the aerospace industry or in other industries where there are similar levels of social 
responsibility. For example, BP, the oil multinational recently faced massive financial and 
social consequences due to the pollution caused by its oil exploration activities off the US 
coast; activities in which there was significant involvement of its suppliers. As the final 
assembler or producer remains liable for the outcomes of its supply chain, there cannot be a 
full partnership with suppliers in the form suggested by Berry et al. (2000). Nevertheless, the 
essential character of the mutual dependence phase of the SCMM still applies and there will 
be very close collaboration with suppliers, as we saw in AIR.    
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
In section 2 we reviewed studies which have explored the relationship between trust and 
control, and concluded that the findings are ambiguous and remain open to debate (Vélez et 
al., 2008). For example, should trust and control be viewed as a dualism or a duality (see 
Khodyakov, 2007; Möllering, 2005)? However, we pointed out that there have been 
relatively few studies which have examined how the relationship between trust and control 
shifts over time, especially as levels of collaboration increase. In this paper, drawing on the 
supply chain maturity model (SCMM) of (such as, Berry et al., 2000; Cullen and Meira, 
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2010; Lamming, 1993; Lockamy and McCormack, 2004), we show that in the early phases of 
supply chain restructuring the relationship between trust and control could be characterised as 
a dualism. Initially, there is a complementary relationship in the autonomous firm phase and 
this evolves into a supplementary relationship in the serial dependence phase. However, in 
the later, more mature, phases the relationship between trust and control becomes a duality, 
as increasing collaboration between the parties leads to the emergence of more complex 
interactions between trust and control during the reciprocal dependence and the mutual 
dependence phases.   
 
Whereas many previous studies have examined the relationship between trust and control 
from a rather static perspective (Coletti et al., 2005; Das and Teng, 2002), by studying a case 
of supply chain restructuring in this paper we have seen that the relationship between trust 
and control can shift over time as the supply chain matures. This enables us to contribute to 
the trust/control literature in several ways. We show how the studied company endeavoured 
to cope with the complexity of the duality of trust and control as collaboration with its 
suppliers increased. In particular, we identified control mechanisms that the company 
developed to manage this complexity; for example, the supplier strategy and the relationship 
profile tool. Furthermore, we illustrated how this led to a move from inter-personal trust to 
inter-organisational trust (as conceived above), and discussed how in this case the supply 
chain managers intervened to maintain and stabilise trust by reducing the uncertainty that can 
be triggered by the high staff turnover in the aerospace industry.  
 
AIR’s efforts to move from inter-personal trust to inter-organisational trust raises two 
practical issues.  Firstly, AIR’s managers introduced a formalised approach to trust, with the 
aim of achieving consistency and standardisation, as they had frequently to rebuild trust 
relations due to high levels of staff turnover. After restructuring its supply chain, building and 
maintaining trust was crucial for AIR, and having to rebuild trust each time relevant staff left 
either AIR or its suppliers was a difficult and time consuming task.  This is unlikely to be a 
problem which is unique to AIR.  In other companies where trust is important in inter-
organisational relationship, rebuilding (inter-personal) trust when staff leave is also likely to 
be a problem.  The relationship profile tool which was developed in AIR was one attempt to 
overcome this problem by providing a mechanism through which partners could monitor, 
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repair or rebuild trust on an ongoing basis. Further research into how other organisations 
attempt to maintain and standardise trust, and whether they have developed similar or other 
such mechanisms, could provide practical insights into this issue. 
 
Secondly, the relationship profile tool also identifies where interventions are needed to ensure 
that trust is maintained, or to repair it where necessary. Vlaar et al. (2007) pointed out that we 
do not know much about how managers can intervene to ensure that trust and control do not 
degrade (or escalate) beyond desirable levels. Studying such interventions could enhance our 
understanding of the evolution of trust and control, as “very low levels of trust and very high 
levels of distrust have a negative effect on interorganizational performance” (ibid., p.415). 
The relationship profile tool monitors the ‘achieved’ level of trust and indicates where 
interventions are required if the desired level of trust in the inter-organisational relationship 
has not been achieved. The relationship profile tool aims to maintain the achieved/desired 
levels of trust and, as such, it is a control mechanism which provides for the maintenance of 
trust. 
 
In this paper we have studied the restructuring of a supply chain from the perspective of the 
assembler of the final product, namely AIR. This provides a one-sided perspective of supply 
chain management and of the relationship between trust and control over time. Unfortunately, 
interviewing the other parties was not possible in this research (due to access difficulties[12]). 
However, supply chain management is a very important activity for an assembler, such as 
AIR, and it is an activity that many such companies are currently restructuring. In this paper 
we have been able to study in-depth the way in which one assembler restructured its supply 
chain. However, it has to be acknowledged that it would have been better if it had been 
possible to interview all the other parties involved in the supply chain. Future research could 
investigate such supply chain restructuring from the perspective of those other parties (i.e., 
the suppliers) and/or study the supply chain as part of a network of relationships. A second 
limitation of this paper relates to the company/industry we investigated. AIR has some 
specific characteristics, which may not be common in other companies or industries, as it 
operates in a highly regulated industry. However, nowadays many hi-tech manufacturing 
industries have quality standards imposed by non-governmental and consumer organisations. 
Furthermore, AIR, because of its position as the final assembler, has significant bargaining 
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power over its suppliers. Therefore, our specific findings are contextual and may not be 
characteristic of supply chains more generally.  Nevertheless, as we indicated earlier, we 
would make a theoretical generalisation, whereby the social processes surrounding the 
trust/control nexus, which we have studied in this paper, are likely to be applicable in other 
supply chains and that the theoretical insights we have gained in this study are thereby 
transferable to other settings. 
 
In future studies of the development of inter-organisational relationships, we would suggest 
that there should be two distinct levels of analysis: (a) the development of inter-
organisational relat onships as the relationships/supply chains mature and (b) the 
development of inter-organisational relationships within mature supply chains; e.g., where 
new suppliers are added to supply chains which are already mature. In this paper, we have 
studied the former; i.e., the restructuring of an existing supply chain. However, there is also a 
need for research which examines the processes, and in particular the relationship between 
trust and control, as new suppliers are added to an already mature supply chain. In such a 
supply chain, where there will be mutual dependence between the existing parties, an 
important question is how a new supplier can be added? Does it have to go through the 
various phases of the SCMM, or are there other processes through which trust can be built, 
and what is the relationship between trust and control in such processes? Such research would 
complement the research reported in this paper which has looked at these relationships as an 
assembler and its suppliers went through the various phases of its supply chain restructuring. 
  
                                               
1
 These are the four phases in Berry et al.'s (2000) supply chain maturity model (SCMM), as will be explained 
later. 
2
 The findings presented here are part from a larger research - see (Author, 2011). 
3
 Parker and Northcott (2016, pp.1116-7) refer to the trustworthiness of the research. 
4
 The exact figures are withheld to disguise the identity of the company. 
5
 The number in brackets refers to the interview number in the Appendix.  
6
 As the continuity of production is of paramount importance for AIR, and the process of approving a new 
supplier for a highly critical commodity can take up to eighteen months, AIR ‘pre-approves’ alternative 
suppliers for critical commodities in order to avoid delays in delivery to final customers due to unexpected 
problems such as fire, natural disaster or even the bankruptcy of a supplier.  
7
 Operational contracts were also signed for projects AIR allocated to the JVs.  
8
 As mentioned earlier, there is a contract review before every new operational contract is signed. These reviews 
took place even during the autonomous firm phase, and they have continued to be undertaken in each of the 
subsequent phases. 
9
 Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats.  
10
 As our research only involved interviews in AIR, we were unable to confirm this. But it seems to us that 
AIR’s assertions are reasonable. 
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11
 In the next (serial dependence) phase of the SCMM there was a supplementary relationship between trust and 
control, and we observed the emergence of goodwill trust, but not the implementation of new control 
mechanisms. This may have been due to the way we chronologically present our findings in terms of the four 
phases of the SCMM. If, instead, we had studied the changes as a continuum this supplementary relationship 
between trust and control might not have emerged. 
12
 However, we did have some informal discussions in one of the joint ventures based in the UK. 
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Appendix: Table of interviewees 
 
No. Date  Management Level 
1 September 2006 Financial Director  
(Preliminary Meeting) 
2 March 2007 Financial Director  
(Second Interview) 
3 March 2007 Purchasing Manager I 
(First Interview) 
4 March 2007 Purchasing Manager II 
5 June 2007 Operations Purchasing Executive 
(First Interview) 
6 June 2007 Financial Controller 
(First Interview) 
7 June 2007 Business Finance Partner for Subsidiaries and JVs 
(First Interview) 
8 September 2007 JV Relationship Manager 
(First Interview) 
9 November 2007 Operations Manager I 
(First Interview) 
10 November 2007 Operations Manager II 
11 November 2007 Management Accountant 
(First Interview) 
12 March 2008 Operations Purchasing Executive 
 (Second Interview) 
13 March 2008 Financial Director of Operations 
14 April 2008 Purchasing Manager I  
(Second Interview) 
15 April 2008 Financial Controller 
 (Second Interview) 
16 May 2008 Business Finance Partner for Subsidiaries and JVs 
 (Second Interview) 
17 May 2008 Operations Manager I 
(Second Interview) 
18 June 2008 Management Accountant 
 (Second Interview) 
19 June 2008 JV Relationship Manager 
(Second Interview) 
20 March 2009 Purchasing Manager I 
 (Third Interview) 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1 Time line of events 
 
Periods  
Period 1: up to 2004 
Autonomous firm   
Traditional style of purchasing  
 • One-off transactions 
 • Arm’s length relationships  
 • No performance measurements 
 • No suppliers’ impact on the design process 
 
 
2004: Milestone for change 
Serial Dependence  
Decision for supply chain restructuring (Consulting report) 
 • Development of global purchasing supply chain strategy  
 • Reduction of suppliers / identification of preferred 
suppliers  
 
 
Period 2: 2004-2006 
Reciprocal Dependence 
Increased collaboration with major suppliers 
 • Long term agreements 
 • Implementation of control mechanisms to the JVs  
 
 
Period 3: 2006 – onwards  
Mutual Dependence Implementation of the new supply chain strategy and various control 
mechanisms 
 • Supplier strategy  
 • Supplier Advanced Business Relationship 
 • Supplier scorecard 
 • Relationship profile tool 
 
Cost management techniques 
• Target costing  
• One-way open book accounting  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Global Purchasing Supply Chain Strategy 
 
Step 1 Rationalise supply base 
 
Exit poor suppliers 
 
 
Step 2 Develop relationships across the supply chain with major suppliers  
 Develop capable low cost sources 
 
Selectively delegate supply chain management responsibility 
 
 
Step 3 Develop an integrated system/module of accountability for major suppliers 
Source: AIR’s Investor Presentation – Internal Documents 
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Table 3 Key Performance Indicators for the Joint Ventures  
 
Operational KPIs 
 
 Financial KPIs  
Cost Productivity Profit & Loss UPBT (Underlying Profit 
Before Tax) 
 
Throughput per hour  
 
Sales 
 
Net sales per hour 
 
Gross Margin 
 
Operating costs 
 
 
Working Capital 
 
Quality Scrap Cost Cost Rate 
 
PPM* Concessions 
 
Operating Costs 
Head Count 
 
PPM Defective 
 
 
 
Customer Incidents 
 
Balance Sheet   Cash (Balance) 
Delivery  Schedule Adherence  Additions to Fixed Assets 
 
Total Arrears  Inventory  
 
Lead time adherence  Debtors 
 
Yield  Creditors 
 
Days arrears   
 
Longest output arrear  
 
  
Inventory Net Inventory   
Source: Internal Documents 
*PPM stands for Parts Per Million 
 
 
Table 4 Suppliers Scorecard: Key Performance Indicators 
 
Quality Delivered Quality PPM* 
 Delivered Quality Concessions PPM 
 Delivered Quality (occurrences) 
 Concessions (occurrences) 
 Customer Complaints 
 
Delivery  Schedule Adherence 
 
Delivery Performance 
 
Total Days Late 
 
Total Schedule Lines Missed 
 
 
Cost Cost of Non-quality 
Source: Internal Documents 
*PPM stands for Parts Per Million 
 
Table 5 Categories included in the Relationship Profile Tool  
 
Mutual respect and mutual benefit All interactions with AIR reinforce mutual benefit and respect. Supplier’s 
capabilities are fully understood and utilised 
Clear purpose and transparent processes Mutual objectives are fully understood 
Collaboration AIR and supplier jointly resolve issues, seek to develop and improve together  
Capable empowered joint teams Clear understanding of responsibilities and processes for each role 
2-way communication Communication from both sides is effective and covers needs 
Act with long-term integrity Trust and honesty characterise the relationship, problems are shared,  no 
opportunistic behaviour 
Source: Internal Documents 
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Table 6 Example of the various scores of long-term integrity 
 
Score Act with long-term integrity 
1 Lack of trust characterised by examples of poor behaviour historically. Perceived lack of honesty or 
delayed sharing of information handicaps the relationship. Short-term opportunistic actions are 
common. 
 
2 Generally relationship is characterised by both parties trust in the other in ‘day-to day’ interaction. 
Some issues are considered to be withheld / not disclosed in a timely manner. Some evidence of short-
term opportunistic actions. 
 
3 Relationship is characterised by both parties implicit trust in the other complemented by honesty and 
integrity in all decisions. With some exceptions, issues are promptly and openly discussed across the 
spectrum of activity. Problems are shared rather than withheld. No deliberate evidence of short-term 
opportunistic actors. 
 
4 Relationship is characterised by both parties implicit trust in the other complemented by honesty and 
integrity in all decisions. Issues are promptly and openly discussed across the spectrum of activity. 
Problems are shared rather than withheld. No evidence of short-term opportunistic actors. 
Source: Internal Documents 
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